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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 32 Spring 1997 Number 3
INTRODUCTION: THE OCTOBER 1995
SUPREME COURT TERM*
The Honorable Sven Erik Holmest
One year ago, I had the privilege of introducing this program on the 1994
Term of the Supreme Court. My remarks at that time emphasized the cases
dealing with federalism and race.' Today, because the emerging trends of the
1994 Term became more pronounced in 1995, I intend to focus primarily on the
same two areas.
In 1994, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez2 limited the power
of Congress to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause for the first time
since its 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel ,Corp.3 In 1995, the
Court's efforts to circumscribe the authority of the national legislature intensi-
fied in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.4 In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme
Court struck down a federal statute that subjected states to the jurisdiction of
the federal courts for purposes of adjudicating disputes with Indian tribes under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).5 The Court held that Congress
lacked Constitutional authority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, thus rendering the IGRA unconstitutional. The opinion in
Seminole Tribe, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded that Congress
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1995 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996.
t United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
1. See Sven Erik Holmes, Introduction: The October 1994 Supreme Court Term, 31 TULSA LJ. 421
(1996).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
3. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4. 116 S. Ct. 1114(1996).
5. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2486 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701-
2721 (1994)).
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lacks the authority to legislate in this area not only under the general provisions
of the Commerce Clause, but also under the very specific provisions of the
Indian Commerce Clause.
The significance of this opinion cannot be understated. Already, states have
brought cases in federal courts challenging the applicability of copyright, patent,
bankruptcy, and environmental laws to the states-all designed to test the outer
reaches of Seminole Tribe and the Commerce Clause itself. More importantly
for future federalism jurisprudence, the Court now appears very comfortable
questioning the power of Congress to act. The Supreme Court is presently dom-
inated by conservative appointees, and its decisions in both Lopez and Seminole
Tribe are certainly consistent with the declared goal of political conservatives to
reduce the role of the federal government in everyday life by reducing the au-
thority of Congress to put it there. If the Court's purpose is to curtail the reach
of the national legislature, that purpose will surely become clear in at least three
cases the Court will decide in the 1996 Term: Mack v. United States,6 which
challenges the authority of Congress to require state officials to carry out cer-
tain gun registration procedures; Freestone v. Cowan,7 a class action under 42
U.S.C. §1983 based upon Arizona's failure to comply with federal requirements
to identify and to seek support from "deadbeat dads" which could ultimately
challenge Congress' ability to require states to pursue child support payments;
and Flores v. City of Boerne,8 which challenges congressional authority to leg-
islate the applicable standards that a court must apply in determining whether a
state action violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.,
The 1995 Term also clarified the trends of the 1994 Term in the area of
race. In 1994, the Court overturned government action involving race in three
cases: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,"° in which the Court subjected to
strict scrutiny federal affirmative action programs that draw racial classifica-
tions; Miller v. Johnson," which held that the use of race as the dominant rea-
son for drawing a legislative district violates the Equal Protection Clause; and
Missouri v. Jenkins,2 which held that a federal court's school desegregation
remedy may not requite a school district to create a magnet school to attract
white students from outside the district. The government actors in these cases
were the United States Congress in Adarand, a state legislature in Miller, and a
federal district court in Jenkins. These decisions suggested that the Supreme
Court was moving toward a judicial declaration that government at all levels
simply lacks the authority under the Constitution to deal with race-related prob-
lems.
6. 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. Printz v. United States, 116 S. CL 2521 (1996).
7. 68 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. Blessing v. Freestone, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (1996).
8. 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293
(1996).
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)).
10. 115 S. C. 2097 (1995).
11. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
12. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
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In the 1995 Term, the Court amplified its views on race in two redistrict-
ing cases: Bush v. Vera,3 which rejected a redistricting plan enacted by the
Texas legislature, and Shaw v. Hunt,4 which overturned a North Carolina re-
districting plan. In Bush, the Court articulated its view of equal protection and
thus put the 1994 cases in perspective: "If the promise of the Reconstruction
Amendments, that our Nation is to be free of state-sponsored discrimination, is
to be upheld, we cannot pick and choose between the basic forms of political
participation in our efforts to eliminate unjustified racial stereotyping by gov-
ernment actors."'" We must wait for future cases to determine whether the
qualifier "unjustified" in fact applies to all government action involving racial
classifications, regardless of the subject matter. Most certainly, if all racial
classifications are found to be "unjustified," we can anticipate that the Court
will strike down any government action dealing with race.
These race and federalism decisions present at least three questions. First,
if we, as a democratic society, are unable to act by and through our elected
representatives, how can we address the very serious problems of race facing
our nation? Indeed, the Court appears to be moving toward a declaration that
this critical social problem is off-limits to government actors--even if those
government actors are members of the white majority seeking to craft programs
and opportunities for minorities. Justice Stevens responded to this view in his
dissent in Shaw v. Hunt, stating:
[I] am convinced that the Court's aggressive supervision of state action
designed to accommodate the political concerns of historically disadvan-
taged minority groups is seriously misguided. A majority's attempt to
enable the minority to participate more effectively in the process of demo-
cratic government should not be viewed with the same hostility that is
appropriate for oppressive and exclusionary abuses of political power. 6
The second question involves judicial restraint. Historically, "judicial re-
straint" has been defined as permitting the legislature to enact laws without
interference from the courts; "judicial activism" has been defined as identifying
individual rights in the Constitution which operate as a shield against certain
legislative action. In both Lopez and Seminole Tribe, however, the Supreme
Court determined that the legislative body involved did not have the authority
to act at all. Arguably, this is another form of judicial activism. Rather than
identifying individual rights, which has the effect of prohibiting legislation, this
form of judicial activism identifies constitutional limits on the legislative
branch, which has the same effect of prohibiting legislation.
The Constitution establishes clear and appropriate limits on judicial author-
ity. A guiding principle in our system of justice is that courts are responsible
for interpreting the law and not making the law. Judicial restraint properly re-
13. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
14. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
15. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956.
16. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1907 (Stevens, J." dissenting).
1997]
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quires that judges show great deference to the acts of the legislative branch and
not legislate from the bench. Courts that fail to exercise judicial restraint are in
effect substituting their views for those of elected officials. Based on the 1994
and 1995 Terms, the question may fairly be asked whether the United States
Supreme Court adheres to such principles of judicial restraint.
Finally, the role of the Supreme Court is to articulate fundamental princi-
ples of law. Its most important constitutional decisions are meant to provide
guidance to government actors, including lower court judges; local, state, and
federal legislators; and executives at all levels of government. These are the
primary consumers of Supreme Court opinions. It merits consideration, howev-
er, whether in the 1995 Term the Supreme Court satisfactorily performed its
function to establish generally applicable principles of law.
Consider the following examples. Romer v. Evans7 struck down a state-
wide referendum in Colorado that was intended to disadvantage individuals on
the basis of sexual orientation. However, sexual preference was not given con-
stitutionally protected status as a result, and it is not clear that Romer would
even apply to another case involving gay rights. United States v. Virginia8
required the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to admit women, in effect outlaw-
ing same-sex education at VMI. It is not clear from that opinion, however, that
state-sponsored same-sex education in other schools is unconstitutional as a
result. BMW North America, Inc. v. Gore9 overturned a punitive damage
award of $2 million, holding that such an award violated the defendant's due
process rights. The opinion, however, provides little useful guidance as to the
appropriate constitutional framework for analyzing punitive damage awards in
the future." Finally, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consor-
tium, Inc. v. FCC,2' Justice Breyer authored the judgment of the Court with
the support of five other justices, but three portions of his opinion received only
four supporting votes, and two other portions of the opinion garnered only three
additional votes. As a result, this opinion cannot serve as controlling authority
in any future case. In short, Denver Telecommunications, like Romer, VMI, and
BMW, has limited precedential value.
These cases at least suggest the question whether the Supreme Court, by
deciding disputes without articulating guiding principles or establishing useful
precedent, is meeting its systemic responsibility to address and resolve the truly
significant issues of constitutional and federal statutory law. I leave that ques-
tion for you to consider as you listen to the excellent program here today.
17. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
18. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
19. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
20. Recently, in Coninental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996), the
Tenth Circuit meticulously applied BMW in reducing a punitive damage award from $30 million to $6 mil-
lion. A close reading of the opinion, however, reveals that even such careful adherence to BMW does not
result in a clearly principled basis for the majority's conclusion that $6 million is the appropriate award-as
opposed to $8 million, $10 million, or even, as suggested by the dissent, $20 million.
21. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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I want to thank you again for being here and to congratulate the University
of Tulsa College of Law for this important event.
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